Why India Refused to Pick a Side on Ukraine — And Why That Was the Strategy

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When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the
world expected India to condemn it. India had
historical ties with Moscow. It had also spent
decades building a strategic partnership with
Washington. The assumption in Western capitals was
that India would eventually be forced to choose.

India chose neither. And it did so deliberately.

At the United Nations, India abstained on every
major resolution condemning Russia's invasion.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar put it
plainly: "Europe has to grow out of the mindset
that Europe's problems are the world's problems
but the world's problems are not Europe's problems."

That single sentence captures India's strategic
doctrine more precisely than any policy paper.

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The Logic of Strategic Autonomy

India's foreign policy has a name for what it was
doing: strategic autonomy. It is not neutrality.
Neutrality is passive — a refusal to take sides.
Strategic autonomy is active — a deliberate
cultivation of relationships with every major power
so that none of them can take India for granted.

The difference matters. A neutral country gets
ignored. A strategically autonomous country gets
courted.

Since 2022, India has been courted by everyone.
The United States fast-tracked defence technology
transfers. Russia offered oil at a 30% discount.
The European Union sent its foreign policy chief
to New Delhi. The Gulf states deepened investment
ties. China, despite the border tensions, kept
trade channels open.

None of this happened by accident.

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The Oil Calculation

India's decision to dramatically increase Russian
oil imports after the invasion was the clearest
signal of its strategic positioning.

In 2021, Russia supplied less than 1% of India's
oil. By 2024, that figure had crossed 40%. India
became Russia's largest oil customer, displacing
Europe almost entirely.

Western governments protested. India listened
politely and continued buying.

The calculation was straightforward. Cheap Russian
oil reduced India's import bill by an estimated
$35 billion in 2023 alone. That money funded
infrastructure, subsidised fertiliser, and kept
inflation in check during a period of global
price volatility.

Energy security is not an abstract concept in a
country where 300 million people still live without
reliable electricity. India's government understood
that sanctioning Russia's oil would export the cost
of Europe's war to Indian households.

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What This Means for the World

India's Ukraine position has reshaped how every
major power thinks about the Global South.

Before 2022, Western foreign policy assumed that
developing nations would fall into alignment
with democratic bloc positions on key votes.
Ukraine shattered that assumption. India, Brazil,
South Africa, and most of the African Union
refused to condemn Russia without qualification.

The implications are structural. The post-Cold War
idea of a "rules-based international order" led
by the West now faces a credible alternative
framing — one where the rules are negotiated,
not inherited, and where major emerging powers
demand a seat at the table where those rules
are written.

India is not leading that challenge. But it is
the most powerful example of it.

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The Jaishankar Doctrine

India's Foreign Minister has articulated the
country's position with unusual clarity for a
diplomat. His 2020 book, The India Way, laid out
a framework that has since become the operating
manual for Indian foreign policy.

The core argument: India should pursue its
national interest without ideological constraint.
It should work with the United States on
technology and defence. It should work with
Russia on energy and legacy arms. It should
engage China on trade while competing with it
strategically. It should lead the Global South
while building ties with the Global North.

This is not contradiction. It is strategy.

The test of whether it is working: every major
power believes it has a special relationship
with India. None of them is wrong. And none of
them can afford to pressure India too hard,
because the cost of losing India's partnership
is higher than the benefit of forcing its
compliance.

Ukraine proved that calculation correct.